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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ST.1\TE OF UT.All, 
J>t aiutijj'-Respondcnt, 
-vs.-
\rlLLLAjJ l{EITH BURRIS, 
De f c nrl ant-Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9939 
BRIEF o~F RESPO·NDENT 
~TATE~I:B~NT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Fifth Dis-
trict Court of the State of Utah, finding the appellant, 
\Yilliam Keith Burris, guilty of the crime of bastardy, 
in Yiolation of Section 77-60-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953. 
DISPOSITIOX IX LOWER COURT 
Pursuant to an unanimous verdict, appellant was 
adjudged by the court to be guilty and was ordered to 
pay the clerk of the court the sum of $40.00 per month for 
support, maintenance and education of the child born to 
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the complaining \Yitness until the child should reach her 
18th birthday . ..:\._ppellant \Yas further ordered to pay the 
actual hospital expenses incurred by the mother in pre-
natal care and delivery of said child, determined by the 
court to be $309.30. l\IoreoYer, appellant was ordered 
to pay to the clerk of the court all costs of prof.lecution 
in the matter. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests this honorable court to affirm 
the judgment of the Fifth District Court. 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
Respondent adopts the Statement of Facts contained 
under the heading, ''State of the Case and the Issues In-
volved," in appellant's brief. 
ARGUI\IENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Article VIII, Section 5, of the Constitution of Utah, 
provides in part : 
'' * * * All civil and criminal business arising in 
any county, must be tried in such county, unless a 
change of venue be taken, in such cases as may be 
provided by law. * * * '' 
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'fhis RPetion, insofar as is pertinent to this rasP, is sup-
plPnlPlltPd hy ~P('tion 78-1~~-7, U.C.A. 1953, \Yhich pro-
vides as follows : 
''ln all othPr rases the netion must be tried in 
the eounty in \vhich the cause of action arises, or 
in thP county in \Yhich any defendant resides at 
the eommeneement of the action; provided, that 
i r an~· such defendant is a corporation, any county 
in ,,·hich such rorporaiton has its principal office 
or plnec of business shall be deemed the county in 
"·hich such corporation resides \vithin the mean-
ing of this seetion. If none of the defendants re-
sides in this state, such action may be commenced 
and tried in any county which the plaintiff may 
dPsignate in his complaint; and if the defendant 
is about to depart from the state, such action may 
be tried in any county where any of the parties 
resides or serYice is had, subject, ho\-rever, to the 
po"·cr of the court to change the place of trial as 
provided by la \\'". " 1 
Seetion 77-60-1, U.C.A. 1953, holds that, 
''When an unmarried female, pregnant or deliv-
ered of a child \vhich by la"T \vill be deemed a bas-
tard, shall1nake conzplaint to a justice of the peace 
ltifhiu the county 1chere she may be so pregn.a!Jit.t or 
delirererl, or 1cherc the person accused may be 
found, and shall accuse, under oath or affirmation, 
a person \vith being the father of such child, it 
shall be the duty of such justice to issue a ~\Yar­
rant against the person so accused and cause him 
1 This statute was found to be constitutional and not inconsistent with Arti-
cle VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution above quoted, in the case 
of Sanipoli v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 31 Utah 114, 86 Pac. 865, 10 
Ann. Cas. 1142, which held that Article VIII, Section 5 means that the 
court shall transact the business of the court, the trial and disposition 
of all matters civil and criminal, in the county where the business exists 
unless a change of venue be had as by law provided. 
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to be brought forthwith before him, or, in his ab-
sence, before any other justice of the peace in such 
county." (Emphasis supplied) 
Assuming the statutes not to be exclusive of earh 
other, and assuming them to be supplemental to one an-
other, venue in bastardy cases can properly be ( 1) in the 
county where the unmarried female resides, or (2) in 
the county where the unmarried female delivers the 
child, or (3) in the county where the accused may be 
found, or ( 4) in the county where the cause of action 
arises ( i. e., presumably 'v here the child is born). In any 
event under no possibility under the facts of this case 
could the action be brought in any other county than Iron. 
A bastardy proceeding, although prosecuted in the 
name of the state and criminal in form, is nevertheless 
civil. State v. Reese, 43 Utah 447, 135 Pac. 270; State v. 
Steadman., 70 Utah 224, 259 Pac. 326; State v. McKrvight, 
76 Utah 514, 290 Pac. 774; Sta.te v. Kra;nendonk, 79 Utah 
239, 9 P. 2d 176. 
Section 78-13-9, U.C.A. 1953, controls 1n regard to 
a change of venue. This statute provides : 
''The court may, on motion, change the place of 
trial in the following cases: 
'' (1) When the county designated Ill the com-
plaint is not the proper county. 
'' ( 2) When there is reason to believe that an im-
partial trial cannot be had in the county, city, or 
precinct de signa ted in the complaint. 
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H (~) \Vhen the convenienr(' of "·itnesses and the 
ends of justice would be promoted by the change. 
'' ( 4) 'Vhen all the parties to an action, by stipu-
lation or by consent in open court entered in the 
minutes, agree that the place of trial may be 
rhanged to another county. Thereupon the court 
must order the rhange as agreed upon.'' 
The Supreme Court of this state in an early case, 
which has been adopted and follo"red in all subsequent 
rasPs on this question, held that the matter of a change of 
,·pnue in any ease "'"here the court has jurisdiction is 
'rithin the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to 
rPviP\r and reversal only for an abuse of the discretion. 
~ee ~'-,lfatl) Y. Carrington, 15 Utah 480, 50 Pac. 526 (1897); 
State Y. Certain. Intoxicating Liquors, 53 Utah 161, 177 
Pac. ~;~() (1918) ; lVinters v. Turner, 7 4 Utah 222, 278 Pac. 
816 (1929); Chamblee v. Stocks and Tibbetts, 9 U. 2d 342, 
344 P. 2d 980. It seems obvious that there are no facts 
st't forth in appellant's brief or in the record which 
w·ould substantiate any claim that Judge Day abused his 
discretion in refusing to grant appellant's motion for a 
change of venue. 
In regard to appellant's assertion that the fact that 
the jury took a relatiYely short time to reach its verdict 
is indicative of pre-judgment of the case. It is a well-
establi~hed principle that the fact the jury returns a ver-
dict after deliberating only a short time does not, stand-
ing alone, justify a conclusion the jury acted capriciously 
or \rns actuated by passion or prejudice. See Thomas v . 
. A.tlanfic Coast Line R. Co., 221 S. C. 462, 71 S.E. 2d 403 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 1952), \Yhere in a negligence action thP jur~T returned 
a verdict for plaintiff after only t\venty minutes' <I(\ lib-
eration. 
It certainly cannot be asserted that the fart that the 
jury took a short time to reach its verdict is indicative 
of any pre-judgment of the case on their part, particu-
larly considering the extended and tedious cxamina tion 
and cross-examination of all witnesses. 
POINT II 
THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
GRANT APPELLANT AN IMMEDIATE 
TRIAL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A VIOLA-
TION OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL., STATU-
TORY, OR COMMON LAW RIGHT OF AP-
PELLANT. 
In support of appellant's position that error was 
committed by the trial court in denying appellant's mo-
tion for an immediate trial, appellant cites Article I, Sec-
tion 12, of the Utah Constitution, \vhich provides in part 
as follows: 
''In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right * * * to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury * * *.'' (Emphasis added) 
It is well established in the State of Utah that even 
though prosecuted in the name of the state and crimi-
na.! in form, a bastardy proceeding is nonetheless civil. 
State v. Reese, supra; Sta.te v. SteadnuJ;n, supra; State v. 
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..1/c/\ni.f/hf, ~upra; l"{fate v. Kraneudouk, supra. Thus, it 
is clear that the constitutional provisions cited hy appel-
lant n rp inapplicable. 
~[orPo\·er, the Federal Constitution, which uses ex-
actly tltP same language, is only applicable to federal 
criminal action, and has no pertinency in state litigation 
whatsopver. See Falko1rski v. J.llayo, 173 F. 2d 742. 
Section 77-60-4, U.C.A. 1953, says: 
''If the defendant pleads not guilty to such infor-
mation and the case is set for trial on the issue of 
fact, and at the da.y appointed for such trial the 
wo1uan has 1lOt been delivered or is unable to at-
feud, the court may continue the case, but shall re-
quire the defendant to give such security as the 
court may deem just to insure his presence to 
answer such information after the birth of the 
child; and if such mother is not able to attend on 
the day appointed, such security shall remain in 
full force until she is able to attend." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
The record ( p. 10) indicates that appellant filed his 
motion :Jiay 7, 1962. ..._~t that time Miss Bauer \Yas not 
yPt delivered and indeed did not deliver until October 
14, 19G~. (See R., p. 14, Defendant's Exhibit No. 1) 
about t"~o months prior to the time the trial was 
actually convened . 
.:\ppellant may contend that this statute is not ap-
propriately asserted because Judge Day had not set this 
matter for trial and there was not a continuance. While 
thi~ may be true, the statute manifests the policy which 
-t 
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justifies Judge Day in denying the demand for imme-
diate trial, for if the trial court is authorized by statute 
to grant a continuance until the injured woman is de-
livered, why can it not refuse to set down a trial date 
initially until the child is born? 
Even assuming that the federal and state constitu-
tional requirements for a speedy trial ,,~ere present in 
this case, the facts herein still don't reveal prejudicial 
error. A "speedy trial" guaranteed to one charged 
"\Yith a criminal offense by both federal and state con-
stitutions is relative, and dependent upon the surround-
ing circumstances. Hanson v. Ragen, 166 F. 2d 608, 
cert. den. 334 U.S. 849, 68 S. Ct. 1501, 92 L. Ed. 177~. 
It has been held that even a lapse of three years did not 
deprive defendant of a. speedy trial where defendant 
didn't show that he was adversely affected in the prepa-
ration or prosecution of his defense. U. S. v. Holmes, 168 
F. 2d 888. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S INSTRUCTION'S, I~DI­
CATING THAT THE FACT AN _._~CCUSATION 
WAS MADE AGAINST DEFENDANT WAS 
NO EVIDENCE, DID NOT CONSTITUTE Al\ 
INSTRUCTION TO IGNORE SOME OF THE 
EVIDENCE AND, THEREFORE, WAS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Appellant complains that Judge Day, in Instruction 
No. 8, by advising the jury that the fact that a complaint 
had been filed did not necessarily indicate the guilt of 
8· 
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defendant, committed error. In this regard, it should be 
uotPd t hn t while the court said: 
''You are instructed that this matter arose and 
came before the court based upon the complaint of 
Bonnie N. Bauer and the information filed by the 
district attorney. The complaint and the informa-
tion are in substance and effect legal pleadings 
a.nd a way of getting the matter before the court 
for determination. However, such documents are 
not evidence and the fact that an accusation is 
made is not evidence. Also the fact that the court 
instructs you concerning the making on an accu-
sation against the defendant is in itself no evi-
dence and is not to be taken as any indication that 
the court either believes or does not believe the 
allegation of the said legal pleadings.'' 
The c.ourt also submitted to the jury the copies of the com-
plaint \vhich were introduced and accepted into evidence 
during the course of the trial for the purpose of impeach-
ing the complaining witness's testimony. Therefore, it 
is obvious that the instruction pertained to the original 
complaint, whic.h was filed in the matter, and had abso-
lutely nothing to do \vith the c.opies which were intro-
duced by defendant in the course of the trial as evidence. 
These, of course, were submitted to the jury for inspec-
tion and for their consideration and there can be no doubt 
that the jury understood that this instruction pertained 
to the original complaint and not to the copies which 
were introduced for the purposes of impeachment by de-
fending counsel. 
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POINT IV 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE REC<lRD 
TO SUBSTANTIATE THE CLAil\I TI-IA'l, 
THE JURY FAILED TO CONSIDER rrHE 
EVIDENCE. 
Appellant concludes from the fact that a juror was 
overheard to remark that he w·as getting tired during the 
course of the tedious direct and cross examinations, and 
the fact that the jury \Yas out only t\Yenty minutes, that 
they failed to consider the evidence submitted. Suffice it 
to say that there is no rule of la\v \vhich requires indi-
vidual jurors to make up their minds in the jury room 
or even to discuss the evidence submitted in the jury 
room. It seems obvious that jurors at the conclusion 
of the oral testimony and an examination of the written 
exhibits could reach an answer to the question of guilt 
or innocence without discussing with other jurors or 
mulling over possibilities \vith other jurors in the jury 
room. It is, moreover, clear that all of the jurors were 
of one mind on the :first ballot and that extended discus-
sion or argument \vas totally unnecessary after each 
juror's opinion \Yas manifested in the jury room. There-
fore, any assignment of error based on such a claim is 
indefensible. 
POINT V. 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT LEGALLY ADl\IIS-
SIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
UNANIMOUS VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
Appellant takes issue \Yith the conclusion of the jury 
10 
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on the grounds that the evidence submitted on the part 
of thP StatP \vas not sufficient to justify a conviction. In 
rPg-n rd to this <'laim, respondent respectfully calls this 
court 'H attPution to the case of State v. J/ cC~tne, 16 Utah 
170, jl Pae. 818 ( 1898), "~herein this court appro-
priatPly stated: 
'· • • • But all the surrounding circumstances were 
sho,vn to the jury, and they found the issues 
against ihe defendant. If the jury believed the 
testimony offered on the part of the prosecutrix, 
it was clearly sufficient to justify the verdict 
found. In such cases, and under such circum-
stances, it is not \Yi thin the legal po,ver of this 
court, under the constitution of this state, to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the jury, even if 
so inclined. This question has been passed upon 
by this court so frequently that it is unnecessary 
to give further reasons, or cite authority, in sup-
port of the position taken." 
It \Yould be superfluous to state authorities for the 
often announced principle that if there is substantial 
evidence to support the conviction, the Supreme Court 
" .. ill not examine the "\veight of the evidence favoring the 
conviction even though there is a conflict of evidence. 
In regard to appellant's claim that there are sub-
~tantial conflicts and inconsistencies in the prosecuting 
"itness 's testimony, it is clear that if the facts are as 
appellant urged at trial, there would be inconsistencies. 
However, the jury either did not accept the facts urged by 
appellant 'vhich would indicate inconsistencies in the 
prosecuting "~itness 's testimony or they concluded that 
11 
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not"--ithstanding these apparent Inconsistencies, l\1iss 
Bauer's relevant testimony was true. 
In regard to appellant's assertion that the latest art 
of intercourse was not within the period of gestation, it 
can readily be seen that conception is highly probable ou 
the days alleged in the complaint. (Record, page 151, 
lines 29-30; page 152, lines 1 to 12.) But, it was also es-
tablished that if the conception took place on either Feb-
ruary 2nd or February 11th, the acts of intercourse would 
be within the period of gestation. (See Record, page 222, 
lines 29-30; page 223, lines 1 to 22.) These facts were 
testified to by defendant's own witness, Dr. Graft. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits that appellant 
has not set forth any reason \Yhich would warrant an 
a \Yard of the relief for which he asks. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN L. JOHNSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
12 
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